Six Questions regarding ROC's Constitutional Revision

As compiled and introduced by the Government Information Office, Republic of China:

Q1. During the past six years, the ROC government has carried out four rounds of constitutional revision. What were the objectives of this latest round?

A1: After the Constitution of the Republic of China was promulgated on January 1, 1947, no formal revisions to the Constitution were made except for modifications of a temporary nature by means of the provisional articles drawn up in 1948. Following the ROC government's relocation to Taiwan in 1949, it began to vigorously carry out constitutional revision in 1991 based on changes in the external and domestic situation and the demand of popular will, so as to promote democracy.

Since the national mobilization measures had served their purposes by 1991, the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion were abolished and Ten Additional Articles were appended to the Constitution. These reformulated the manner of electing representatives to the National Assembly and the Legislature, and for appointing Control Yuan members. Subsequently, elections for the entire membership of the two parliamentary bodies were held to enhance the legitimacy of government and make it more representative.

In 1992, delegates to the Second National Assembly, bearing a fresh popular mandate, reviewed and revised systemic problems concerning central and local government. They adopted eight more Additional Articles redefining the powers and responsibilities of the National Assembly, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan. Most important among these was the definitive establishment of the principle that the president and vice president would be elected through universal suffrage, and the modification of the organization and functions of the Control Yuan.

In 1994, the 18 Additional Articles, reached through the previous two rounds of constitutional reform, were reduced to a set of ten, which changed the rules and procedures for electing delegates to the National Assembly and members of the Legislature.

In 1997, these ten Additional Articles were amended and expanded into 11. Of these, the most important changes revoked the Legislature's right to confirm the appointment of the premier, gave the president the power to dissolve the Legislature, and allowed the Legislature to dismiss the premier through a no-confidence vote. The revisions also reduced the administrative layers, suspended elections for the Taiwan provincial governor and provincial assembly, and streamlined the structure and functions of the provincial government.

This round of constitutional revision had two objectives: 1) to establish a sound system of central government and lay a solid foundation for the long and peaceful rule of the nation, and 2) to raise administrative efficiency and national competitiveness by paring back the number of governmental layers. These two clear and concrete goals are designed to enhance honest and competent government, modify the political climate, and implement multi-party politics to ensure the stability and development of democracy.

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Q2. Have the newly revised Additional Articles of the Constitution expanded presidential power?

A2: Frankly, not only has there been no increase in presidential power as a result of the newly revised Additional Articles, that power has been pretty much restricted, for the following reasons.

First, the Legislature has the power to dismiss the premier through a no-confidence vote.[1] This is a check-and-balance measure against the president's power to dissolve the Legislature.[2] Second, the president is restricted by his term of office.[3] He is further restricted by the Legislature's right to impeach him.[4] Another restriction comes in the form of the electorate's right of recall.[5] Third, the premier appointed by the president is accountable to the Legislature. The Legislature can therefore impose indirect restrictions on the president.[6] In sum, although this round of constitutional revision has resulted in the loss by the Legislature of its right to confirm the appointment of the premier, the Legislature nonetheless has obtained the power to dismiss the premier through a no-confidence vote and thus it can exercise considerably effective restraint on the president's power to appoint the premier. Under the newly revised Additional Articles, if the political party to which the president belongs does not have a majority in the Legislature, then the presidential powers will be extremely limited. In this new constitutional configuration, no matter what the system of government in the future, the Legislature is vested with absolute check-and-balance power over the executive branch.

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Q3. Do the newly revised Additional Articles of the Constitution accord with the spirit of balanced powers and responsibilities?

A3: The newly revised Additional Articles have retained the mechanism that holds the Executive Yuan accountable to the Legislature. However, a new provision has been added, giving the Legislature the power to dismiss a premier through a no-confidence vote,[7] and lowering the threshold required to override a request from the Executive Yuan for legislative reconsideration of a particular bill from two-thirds to only half of the membership of the Legislature.[8] Both measures are designed to promote the balance of powers and responsibilities. These, and the various restrictions on the president's powers mentioned earlier, are conducive to enhancing the voting responsibility of the Legislature, ensuring the accountability of the Executive Yuan to the Legislature, and establishing an overall system of accountability. Since the problems of unclear political accountability resulting from headstrong voting in the Legislature under the old system will not recur, political parties will interact through policy discussions, and this can spur positive interaction between political parties.

In sum, accountable politics can be realized under this new system of constitutional government.

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Q4. Do the revised Additional Articles provide for the Executive Yuan to request a reconsideration of the bills passed by the Legislative Yuan?

A4: According to Article 3 of the revised Additional Articles, "Should the Executive Yuan deem a statutory, budgetary, or treaty bill passed by the Legislative Yuan difficult to execute, the Executive Yuan may, with the approval of the president of the Republic and within ten days of the bill's submission to the Executive Yuan, request the Legislative Yuan to reconsider the bill. The Legislative Yuan shall reach a resolution on the returned bill within 15 days after it is received. Should the Legislative Yuan be in recess, it shall convene of its own accord within seven days and reach a resolution within 15 days after the session begins. Should the Legislative Yuan not reach a resolution within the said period of time, the original bill shall become invalid. Should more than one-half of the total number of Legislative Yuan members uphold the original bill, the president of the Executive Yuan shall immediately accept the said bill."

Said simply, the original constitution stipulated that if two-thirds of the members of the Legislature upheld the original resolution, the premier shall either abide by the resolution or resign from office. Reconsiderations, although passed more easily, could be boycotted by the Legislature; therefore, the Executive Yuan rarely made such requests. However, under the newly revised Additional Articles, if one-half of the total members of the Legislative Yuan uphold the original resolution, then the premier must accept the original resolution but need not resign from office. The Legislative Yuan must handle the request for a reconsideration within a specific period of time, otherwise, the original legislative resolution shall be null and void. Under the revised Articles, the threshold for upholding the original resolution has been lowered. As the premier no longer needs to risk resignation, there will be a geater chance for a request of reconsideration if the Executive Yuan deems a legislative resolution extremely difficult to implement. This will contribute to positive interaction between the Legislature and the Executive Yuan.

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Q5. What is the purpose of downsizing the provincial government and of forgoing elections for the Taiwan provincial governor and provincial assembly?

A5: The main concern for streamlining the provincial government and forgoing elections for the Taiwan provincial governor and provincial assembly is to enhance the overall administrative efficiency of the government. The Taiwan Provincial Government has jurisdiction over 98 percent of the Taiwan area and 80 percent of the population of that area. Taiwan Provincial Government-supervised enterprises account for more than half of the total production value of all government-run enterprises. As government agencies, manpower, and functions are superimposed at the central and provincial government levels, waste of resources is obvious. In addition, the president and the provincial governor are both directly elected by the people. Their electorates are almost the same and should be adjusted. No major problems would arise if the president and the provincial governor are affiliated with the same political party. However, if they belong to different political parties, friction and conflict are likely to occur between the central and local governments, which would be detrimental to overall government operations. After downsizing the organization and function of the provincial government, most of the affairs previously under its management would be transferred to either the central or local government depending on their criteria.

The forgoing of mayoral elections for rural and urban townships will raise administrative efficiency. Elections held for the four administrative levels of government (central, provincial/municipal, county/city, and rural/urban townships) have been held too frequently and waste massive resources of both the government and private sectors. The elections often become a hotbed for underground and big money politics. After the constitutional amendments, there will be only one level of local government, which should substantially help boost administrative efficiency and promote political honesty and competence.

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Q6. What kinds of adjustments have been made in the central government system through this constitutional amendment?

A6: As far as the central government system is concerned, the president is now empowered to appoint the premier without the confirmation of the Legislature; and if the Legislature adopts a no-confidence vote against the premier, the president of the Republic has the right to dissolve the Legislature after consulting with its president. As for the Executive Yuan, if it requests the Legislature to reconsider a resolution on a statutory, budgetary, or treaty bill that it passed earlier, the premier must accept the decision if more than half of all members of the Legislature uphold the original resolution. However, the premier does not have to resign from office. As for the Legislature, even though it has the right to vote the premier out of office with the concurrence of more than half of all the legislators, if a no-confidence motion fails to win majority approval, the Legislature cannot initiate another no-confidence vote against the premier within the next 12 months. In addition, the Legislature may, through the resolution of a two-thirds majority of its members, submit a proposal to impeach the president or the vice president to the National Assembly.

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NOTES

1. See Additional Articles, Article 3: "With the signatures of more than one-third of the total number of Legislative Yuan members, the Legislative Yuan may propose a no-confidence vote against the president of the Executive Yuan [premier]. Seventy-two hours after the no-confidence motion is made, an open-ballot vote shall be taken within 48 hours. Should more than one-half of the total number of Legislative Yuan members approve the motion, the president of the Executive Yuan shall tender his resignation within ten days, and at the same time may request that the president dissolve the Legislative Yuan. Should the no-confidence motion fail, the Legislative Yuan may not initiate another no-confidence motion against the same president of the Executive Yuan within one year."

2. See Additional Articles, Article 2: "The president may, within ten days following passage by the Legislative Yuan of a no-confidence vote against the president of the Executive Yuan, declare the dissolution of the Legislative Yuan after consulting with its president."

3. Article 2 of the Additional Articles: "The terms of office for both the president and the vice president shall be four years. The president and the vice president may only be re-elected to serve one consecutive term...."

4. See Additional Articles, Article 4: "Impeachment of the president or the vice president by the Legislative Yuan for treason or rebellion shall be initiated upon the proposal of more than one-half of all members of the Legislative Yuan and passed by more than two-thirds of all such members, whereupon it shall be submitted to the National Assembly."

5. See Additional Articles, Article 2: "Recall of the president or the vice president shall be motioned by one-fourth of all delegates to the National Assembly, proposed with the concurrence of two-thirds of such delegates, and passed by more than one-half of the valid ballots in a vote in which more than one-half of the electorate in the free area of the Republic of China takes part."

6. See Additional Articles, Article 3: "The Executive Yuan shall be responsible to the Legislative Yuan in accordance with the following provisions; the provisions of Article 57 of the Constitution shall cease to apply: "1. The Executive Yuan has the duty to present to the Legislative Yuan a statement on its administrative policies and a report on its administration.... "2. Should the Executive Yuan deem a statutory, budgetary, or treaty bill passed by the Legislative Yuan difficult to execute, the Executive Yuan may, with the approval of the president of the Republic and within ten days of the bill's submission to the Executive Yuan, request the Legislative Yuan to reconsider the bill."

7. See the second paragraph of the answer to Question 2.

8. See answer to Question 4.

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